Felix Klein
Historian Herbert Mehrtens sought to portray the history of turn-ofthe-century mathematics as a struggle of modern vs countermodern, represented respectively by David Hilbert and Felix Klein; see e.g., Mehrtens [39] . Some of Mehrtens' conclusions have been picked up by both historians (e.g., Jeremy Gray [18] ) and mathematicians (e.g., Frank Quinn [46] ).
To be sure, notable differences in outlook existed between Hilbert and Klein. Thus, Hilbert did not share Klein's intense interest in the history of mathematics (see e.g., Rowe [53, p. 192] ), and Klein was less interested in axiomatics than Hilbert (see e.g., Weyl [63, p. 16] ). However, such differences though undeniable were extrapolated by scholars like Mehrtens to extravagant proportions.
Against Mehrtens, we argue that Klein and Hilbert were not adversaries but rather modernist allies in a bid to broaden the scope of mathematics beyond a narrow focus on arithmetized analysis as practiced by the Berlin school, so as to include set theory, axiomatisation of physics, and other innovative directions.
To this end, we analyze Klein's Göttingen lecture [30] and other texts. Felix Klein's 1895 Göttingen address was as influential as it is apparently controversial, as we will see in later sections.
1.1. The Göttingen address. Here Klein spoke of an important mathematical tendency which has as its chief exponent Weierstrass. . . I refer to the arithmetizing of mathematics. [30, p. 241] (emphasis in the original) The passage makes clear Klein's appreciation of the significance of the framework developed by Weierstrass and others. According to Klein, the framework constituted an advance over earlier reliance on spatial intuition as a basis for proofs:
Gauss, taking for granted the continuity of space, unhesitatingly used space intuition as a basis for his proofs; but closer investigation showed not only that many special points still needed proof, but also that space intuition had led to the too hasty assumption of the generality of certain theorems which are by no means general. Hence arose the demand for exclusively arithmetical methods of proof. . . (ibid.) The break with Gauss' view is particularly significant and underscores the modernity of Klein's. Such "arithmetical methods" meant that nothing shall be accepted as a part of the science unless its rigorous truth 1 can be clearly demonstrated by the ordinary operations of analysis. (ibid.) Although vague notions, like magnitude, continuous variable, etc., were still in use in these new developments, Klein believed that further refinements could be introduced through the limitations on the notion of quantity (as in Kronecker's approach) or through the application of symbolic language (the approach of Peano and his school). Klein continued:
Thus, as you see, while voluntarily acknowledging the exceptional importance of the tendency, I do not grant that the arithmetized science is the essence of mathematics. . . I consider that the essential point is not the mere putting of the argument into the arithmetical form, but the mere rigid logic obtained by means of this form.
(ibid., p. 242) Klein felt that the pursuit of abstraction is an open-ended process that need not stop with Weierstrass. Klein's enthusiasm for the arithmetization of analysis was evident. Also in evidence is his appreciation of new logical and (as we will show below) foundational studies, even though the term logic did not have the meaning we attach to it today. 2 It is in this context that we should view Klein's further claim to the effect that it is not possible to treat mathematics exhaustively by the method of logical deduction alone, but that, even at the present time, intuition has its special province. (ibid., p. 242) (emphasis added) 1 The phrase "rigorous truth' is meaningless according to contemporary usage in modern mathematics, and is a mistranslation found in Isabel Maddison's (on the whole adequate) translation. ] only those propositions are to be considered the secure possession of science which can clearly be demonstrated to be identically valid by applying the usual arithmetical operations.' In particular, Klein's 'identisch richtig' (which Maddison rendered as 'rigorous truth') is the German equivalent of the English 'identically valid'. 2 In this area Klein was more of an enabler of new mathematics than a direct contributor ; he expressed his personal preference as follows: "symbolic methods. . . this subject does not appeal to me personally" (ibid., p. 243).
We will deal with Klein's stance on intuition (mentioned in the comment just cited) in Section 1.2 immediately following.
Spatial intuition.
In the remainder of his address, Klein seeks to place the role of spatial intuition in relation to logical and axiomatic developments. Klein is somewhat ambiguous as to the meaning he attaches to the term intuition. One can single out three possible meanings:
(1) intuition as an indispensable tool in research; 3 (2) intuition as an indispensable tool in teaching; 4 (3) axiomatic accounts are insufficient and intuition must play its role in mathematical arguments.
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What we wish to emphasize is that even if meaning (3) occurs here at all, it occurs on a sophisticated level as indicated by Klein's endorsement of the arithmetic foundations for analysis (therefore no more intuitive talk of real numbers) and his comments on Green's theorem and electricity (emphasizing that physical intuition is insufficient to prove mathematical theorems); see Section 1.5. Klein's comment on Gauss quoted in Section 1.1 indicates that Klein clearly distanced himself from a reliance on spatial intuition as replacement for analysis. Even if at some sophisticated level Klein thought that axiomatic approach will be insufficient, no investigation of such a possible level of Klein's term intuition appears in Mehrtens's book, which contains little indication that he would actually have the mathematical wherewithal to carry out such an investigation. The level of mathematical competence possessed by Mehrtens is illustrated by his comment that "if it were possible to represent π by an algebraic equation, then the construction [i.e., squaring the circle] would be possible with compass and 3 As when Klein writes: "I might now introduce a historical excursus, showing that in the development of most of the branches of our science, intuition was the starting point, while logical treatment followed" [30, p. 246] . 4 As when Klein writes: "Among the teachers in our Gymnasia the need of mathematical instruction based on intuitive methods has now been so strongly and universally emphasized that one is compelled to enter a protest, and vigorously insist on the necessity for strict logical treatment. This is the central thought of a small pamphlet on elementary geometrical problems which I published last summer. Among the university professors of our subject exactly the reverse is the case; intuition is frequently not only undervalued, but as much as possible ignored" [30, p. 248] . 5 As when Klein writes: "On the other hand I have to point out most emphaticallyand this is the negative part of my task-that it is not possible to treat mathematics exhaustively by the method of logical deduction alone, but that, even at the present time, intuition has its special province" [30, p. 242] .
straightedge" [39, p. 111] . This amounts to an incorrect claim to the effect that every algebraic number is constructible ( 3 √ 2 is algebraic but non-constructible).
Klein felt that arithmetization of geometry meant that geometrical objects are given by formulas and are dealt with by means of analytic geometry and analytic methods:
The arithmetizing of mathematics began originally, as I pointed out, by ousting space intuition; the first problem that confronts us as we turn to geometry is therefore that of reconciling the results obtained by arithmetical methods with our conception of space. By this I mean that we accept the ordinary principles of analytical geometry, and try to find from these the geometrical interpretation of the more modern analytical developments. [30, p. 243] The obvious advantage consists in the refinement of space intuition:
The net result is, on the one hand, a refinement of the process of space intuition; and on the other, an advantage due to the clearer view that is hereby obtained of the analytical results considered, with the consequent elimination of the paradoxical character that is otherwise apt to attach itself to them. (ibid., p. 243)
The next advantage is idealisation, namely a mathematical form of an imprecise intuition:
We ultimately perceive that space intuition is an inexact conception, and that in order that we may subject it to mathematical treatment, we idealize it by means of the so-called axioms, which actually serve as postulates. (ibid., p. 243-244; emphasis added) 1.3. Idealisation in physics. As for idealisation in mechanics and mathematical physics, Klein writes:
Throughout applied mathematics, as in the case of space intuition, we must idealize natural objects before we can use them for purposes of mathematical argument; but we find continually that in one and the same subject we may idealize objects in different ways, according to the purpose that we have in view. (ibid., p. 244)
In the realm of practical physics, idealisation provides precisely defined objects like Green's function (see Section 1.5), that enable new physical insights as well as abstract mathematical arguments. Yet Klein's intuition is twofold:
. . . [1] the cultivated intuition just discussed, which has been developed under the influence of logical deduction and might almost be called a form of memory; but rather of [2] the naïve intuition, largely a natural gift, which is unconsciously increased by minute study of one branch or other of the science. (ibid., p. 245-246)
Klein elaborates as follows:
The word intuition (Anschauung) is perhaps not well chosen; I mean it to include that instinctive feeling for the proportion of the moving parts with which the engineer criticises the distribution of power in any piece of mechanism he has constructed; and even that indefinite conviction the practiced calculator possesses as to the convergence of any infinite process that lies before him. I maintain that mathematical intuition -so understood -is always far in advance of logical reasoning and covers a wider field. (ibid.) Thus Klein's intuition [1] is cultivated (under the influence of logical deduction), while intuition [2] is the most basic in his vision of mathematics, namely prelogical:
Logical investigation is not in place until intuition has completed the task of idealisation. (ibid., p. 247) Klein finds confirmation of the idea that intuition was the starting point, whereas logical treatment followed, not only in the historical origins of infinitesimal calculus, but also in Minkowski's development of the theory of numbers.
As for the intuition [2] and pedagogy, Klein writes that two classes at least of mathematical lectures must be based on intuition; the elementary lectures which actually introduce the beginner to higher mathematicsfor the scholar must naturally follow the same course of development on a smaller scale, that the science itself has taken on a larger -and the lectures which are intended for those whose work is largely done by intuitive methods, namely, natural scientists and engineers.
(ibid., p. 248)
To be sure, Klein's speculations on intuition are not profound; modern philosophers may find them problematic. Our goal here is not to argue that Klein was a great philosopher but rather to indicate that his preoccupations were those of modern mathematicians. If Mehrtens wishes to champion the cause of specifically modern mathematics, he cannot easily dismiss today's mathematicians as being just as countermodern with regard to intuition as he claims Klein is. Today mathematicians are still struggling with the role of intuition in the creative process.
1.4. Attitude toward logic and foundations. Klein recognized the significance of the contemporary developments in logic associated with the names of Peano and others, when he spoke of efforts made to introduce symbols for the different logical processes, 6 in order to get rid of the association of ideas, and the lack of accuracy which creeps in unnoticed, and therefore not allowed for, when ordinary language is used. In this connection special mention must be made of an Italian mathematician, Peano, of Turin. . . [30, p . 242] Klein's warm relationship with Pasch (see Schlimm [55] ) further attests to Klein's visionary appreciation of contemporary developments in axiomatic foundations. At the same time, Klein voiced a cautionary note: "while voluntarily acknowledging the exceptional importance of the tendency, I do not grant that the arithmetized science is the essence of mathematics" (see Section 1.1 for a longer quotation). To Klein, the significance of the new methodology goes hand in hand with a rejection of 19th century methodology:
From this outline of the new geometrical programme you see that it differs greatly from any that was accepted during the first half of this [i. 1.5. Klein on Green's function. Klein goes on to note the distinction between, on the one hand, a physical phenomenon and, on the other, a mathematical theorem attempting to capture the latter. He illustrates such a distinction by citing the example that "in electricity. . . a conductor under the influence of a charged point is in a state of electrical equilibrium" whose mathematical counterpart is the existence of Green's function, and concludes:
You see here what is the precise object of these renewed investigations; not any new physical insight, but abstract mathematical argument in itself, on account of the clearness and precision which will thereby be added to our view of the experimental facts. (ibid.; emphasis added) It emerges that according to Klein the ultimate criterion of the validity of a theorem is "mathematical argument" rather than physical insight.
1.6. Pedagogy. Going on to pedagogy, Klein notes: "I must add a few words on mathematics from the point of view of pedagogy" (ibid., p. 247). University professors bear the brunt of Klein's critique:
Among the university professors of our subject exactly the reverse is the case; intuition is frequently not only undervalued, but as much as possible ignored. This is doubtless a consequence of the intrinsic importance of the arithmetizing tendency in modern mathematics. But the result reaches far beyond the mark. It is high time to assert openly once for all that this implies, not only a false pedagogy, but also a distorted view of the science. (ibid., p. 248) (emphasis added) While cautious about possible deleterious effects on pedagogy, Klein welcomed the arithmetizing tendency where appropriate, and made common cause with Hilbert in most cases.
The visionary nature of Klein's Erlangen program (EP) is widely known and acknowledged even by Gray (see Section 4.1) though not by Mehrtens (see Section 3). A major weakness of Mehrtens' book is his failure to address the importance of category theory in modern mathematics. The EP focused on transformations of objects rather than objects themselves, a viewpoint recognizable as a foundation rock of the category-theoretic approach; see Marquis [37] . What is remarkable is that even Mehrtens' nemesis Bieberbach acknowledged that the EP was a precursor of the axiomatic method (see Segal [57, p. 347 It has to be admitted, of course, that Riemann himself slightly disguised the true relationship between [complex] functions and Riemann surfaces, by the form of his presentation-perhaps for the one reason only that he did not want to visit overly alien ideas upon his contemporaries; he disguised this relationship in particular by only speaking of those multi-sheeted Riemann-surfaces covering the plane which have finitely many ramification points, which [by the way] even today are those which one primarily thinks of when the topic of Riemann surfaces is mentioned, and that Riemann did not use the more general idea (which only later was developed to transparent clarity by K l e i n), an idea whose characteristic property can be described as follows: any connection with the complex plane, and generally any connection with three-dimensional point-spaces has been severed, and severed in principle. And yet, without any possible doubt, only with Klein's conception does the basic thought of Riemann come to life and is the natural simplicity, vitality and effective force of these ideas made visible. The present work is based on these [i.e., Klein The most important of the basic thoughts [in Weyl's book] are due to the man to whom I was permitted to dedicate this book in sincere and profound reference. Geheimrat 7 Klein has insisted, despite being overburdened by other tasks, and despite his failing health, to discuss the entire subject matter in frequent meetings with me; I owe a great debt of gratitude to him for his remarks which on several occasions have caused me to replace my initial presentation with a more correct and suitable one. (ibid., p. IX) Weyl makes it clear that Klein made great sacrifices of time and energy to support the first abstract and axiomatic (and hence textbookmodern) presentation of the theory of Riemann surfaces. This is a factual argument against Mehrtens' counter-Klein thesis analyzed in Section 3.
Karl Weierstrass (1815-1897)
The seminal contribution of Karl Weierstrass to the development of modern analysis is well known and requires no special comment. In this section we will focus on Weierstrass' comments on intuition and ethnicity, and compare them to Klein's. Having thus analyzed Kummer, Weierstrass goes on to provide his insights into Kronecker's temperament:
Kronecker is different, he familiarizes himself quickly with everything that is new, his facility of perception enables him to do so, but it does not happen deeply; he does not have the talent to apply the same interest to good work of others as to his own work. (ibid.)
Weierstrass then proposes the following analysis of such differences in mathematical temperaments:
This is compounded by a defect which can be found in many very intelligent people, especially those from the semitic tribe[;] 8 he [i.e., Kronecker] does not have sufficient imagination (I should rather say: intuition) and it is true to say that a mathematician who is not a little bit of a poet, will never be a consummate mathematician. Comparisons are instructive: the all-encompassing view which is directed towards the Highest, the Ideal, 9 marks out, in a very striking manner, Abel as better than Jacobi, marks out Riemann as better than all his contemporaries (Eisenstein, Rosenhain), and marks out Helmholtz as better than Kirchhoff (even though the latter did not have a droplet of semitic blood ).
10 (ibid.; emphasis added) Notes Rowe: "These remarks, echoed in the very same stereotypes set forth by anti-Semites like Dingler and Bieberbach fifty years later, are a good illustration of how deeply rooted such thinking was in German culture" (Rowe [52, p. 443] ).
Weierstrass' speculations as to the insufficient endowment in intuition on the part of the semitic tribe marks out Weierstrass as a better candidate than Klein (who never proffered such speculations) for countermodern leadership, by Mehrtens' own standards. We would like to suggest that Mehrtens' book is critically flawed in having misidentified its protagonists: while Hilbert can serviceably provide modern leadership, his opposite numbers at the helm of the intuitive countermoderns should have been Weierstrass and his students (see Bair et al. [2] ) rather than Klein.
We would like to clarify that Weierstrass made these comments in a private letter, and did not anticipate that his classification will be amplified through publication by Mittag-Leffler. Klein, on the other hand, made his comments on Teutonic, Latin and Hebrew characteristics (see Section 4.9) in a public address (Klein [29] The nailing comment is followed by a piece of advice for Schwarz:
But, dear friend, don't let yourself be led astray, go on to correctly walk your walk, teach and work in your thorough style-thus you will best counteract the swindle, 13 even though initially, you will have to brace yourself for this, the big crowd 14 will turn to the newly rising sun.
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(Weierstrass as cited in Confalonieri [10, p. 288 ]) Weierstrass appears to be mixing metaphors here. The sunflower follows the sun, just as a crowd blindly follows a new fad. Weierstrass' newly rising sun appears to refer to Klein.
These comments by Weierstrass are significant because they indicate that he had a fundamental disagreement with Klein over the nature and future of mathematics. Weierstrass seems to have viewed Klein's interests such as the Erlangen program as a passing fad (that goes away as quickly as the sun sets). Huygens had similar feelings about Leibniz' calculus, in that he thought it was merely a repackaging of existing techniques.
Mehrtens on Klein
In november 1933 philosopher Hugo Dingler filed a pamphlet against Klein (1849 Klein ( -1925 12 In the original: "Du Bois-Reymond trifft doch zuweilen den Nagel auf den Kopf, er nannte vor Jahren schon das Trifolium Klein-Lie-Mayer 'société thuriféraire'." 13 In the original: "Schwindel". Weierstrass' term apparently refers to the activity of the Klein-Lie-Mayer society and connects well with Weierstrass' epithet Blender used by Weierstrass in 1892 in reference to Klein. 14 The words "der große Heifer" in Confalonieri's transcription are possibly a corruption of "der große Haufen". Weierstrass' manuscript shows a black speck above the squiggly line representing this word. The speck is most likely an overline that was once used in German to distinguish a handwritten 'u' from a handwritten 'n'. Confalonieri seems to have mistaken the speck for a dotted 'i', leading him to guess 'Heifer' (not a word in German). 15 The words "der neu mitgehenden Sonne" in Confalonieri's transcription are possibly a corruption of "der neu aufgehenden Sonne". Note that the word in question starts with the glyph that Weierstrass uses for 'a'.
with Jews and foreigners, and that Klein was hungry for power to control German mathematics and re-make it along Jewish lines and in sum was un-German; see Rowe [52] .
Bieberbach versus Dingler.
A quarter century after defending his thesis under Klein, Ludwig Bieberbach made a claim contrary to Dingler's regarding Klein, with the latter now becoming emphatically German; see Bieberbach [6] . Thus Bieberbach sought to attribute his own (Bieberbach's) views concerning German mathematics to Klein himself, and to co-opt the latter in the service of an unsavory ideology.
Bieberbach relied on a dichotomy of S-type versus J-type borrowed from Jaensch [26] . Here S-type (for Strahltypus) refers to a "radiating" type that "only values those things in Reality which his intellect infers in it" and moreover "denies the connection to an outer reality that is not mentally constructed" (see Segal [57, p. 365] ).
In contrast, the J-type (or I-type, for Integrationstypus) refers to one who "is wide-open to Reality" and "lets the influence of experience stream into him" (see Segal [57, [362] [363] for details).
The Jews Jacobi and Landau among others was construed as S-types, whereas Klein as a J-type. 16 The historian confidently announced that "Klein is indeed a representative of countermodernism" (Mehrtens [41, p. 520] ). What Mehrtens found countermodern in Klein is Klein's mathematical outlook rather than his mathematical output.
To contrast Klein with Hilbert, Mehrtens introduced a dichotomy of countermodern (C-type for short) and modern (M-type for short), with Klein construed as C-type and Hilbert as M-type (C-and M-notation ours).
Mehrtens not only claimed that Klein was C-type but also dropped both damaging innuendo that Klein may have ultimately been an enabler of the national-socialist ideology and odious allegations of racism, as analyzed in Sections 3.4 and 4.3.
Note that the onus is on Mehrtens to convince the reader that he is pursuing a meaningful dichotomy of C-type versus M-type. We argue that by pursuing extraneous issues, Mehrtens obscures the true vital issues of the period, and moreover reveals his ideological parti pris in the process.
3.4. Racism. Mehrtens' page 520 contains no fewer than six occurrences of the term racism; thus, we find:
The case of Bieberbach as well as the behaviour of some other mathematicians suggest the thesis that mathematical counter-modernism is correlated to nationalism and eventually also to racism. (ibid.; emphasis added) Furthermore, Klein is indeed a representative of counter-modernism, but his racism is more of the theoretical type. (ibid.; emphasis added) Mehrtens' procedure here is objectionable on several counts:
• The juxtaposition of the two passages (one on Bieberbach and one on Klein) in close proximity suggests a spurious affinity between them; • the claim of being a "racist of a theoretical type" presupposes being a racist in the first place, an allegation against Klein that Mehrtens has not yet established.
Now the term racist can be given (at least) two distinct meanings:
(1) someone interested in analyzing differences in intellectual outlook among distinct ethnicities (racist1 ); (2) someone who believes in the inferiority of one ethnicity to another based on such differences, and advocates corrective action (racist2 ).
Klein's discussions of ethnic differences possibly make him racist1. Yet Mehrtens' comments on Bieberbach clearly indicate that Mehrtens has racist2 in mind when he uses the term:
When the National Socialists came to power in 1933, [Bieberbach] attempted to find political backing for his counter-modernist perspective on mathematics, and declared both, intuition and concreteness, to be the inborn characteristic of the mathematician of the German race, while the tendency towards abstractness and unconcrete logical subtleties would be the style of Jews and of the French (Mehrtens 1987 It is part of modernity of the modern world. Turning to the political side of my topic, I want to state very briefly the sociological argument. I take mathematical modernism to be the defining center of a socially modernized professional and autonomous mathematics business, concentrating and symbolizing itself as a research discipline. Modernism is, so to speak, the avantgarde of the profession, defining the real, the pure, and the most progressive type of mathematics. The business, however, includes much more than avant-garde research. Mathematicians of a more conservative type or mathematicians in applications, hybrid fields or in teaching cannot fully identify with the modernist attitude. The problem with such a definition is that Klein becomes tautologously a C-type here, because "mathematicians in applications" are defined as incapable of fully identifying with the modernist attitude. The talk about "socially modernized professional and autonomous mathematics business" would indicate on the contrary that Klein is a modernist, since nobody contributed to the flourishing of professional mathematics institutions as he did.
Readers can wonder what "the real, the pure, and the most progressive type of mathematics" is exactly. Mehrtens defines modernist mathematics as the real, the pure, and the most progressive type but the definition seems circular. What is progressive mathematics if not modern?
Readers can have similar doubts about the a priori exclusion of applied mathematicians from the rarefied realm of the modernist species. Thus, Abraham Robinson published numerous articles in applied mathematics as well as a joint book called Wing theory [48] (yes, these are airplane wings, not a branch of ring theory). Yet his philosophical stance is close to Hilbert's formalism; see Robinson's essay "Formalism 64" [50] (See also Corry [11] .) If applications are specifically excluded from the realm of mathematical modernism, what is one to make of this application to physics pursued by Mehrtens' modernist hero Hilbert? When Mehrtens proclaims: "I take mathematical modernism to be the defining center of a socially modernized. . . mathematics business," anyone with a background in (mathematical) logic might wonder how one can define mathematical modernism in terms of modernized business without committing an elementary logical error of circularity. In short, what Mehrtens provides here is not a definition of modernism but rather an assortment of cherry-picked conditions designed specifically to exclude. . . Felix Klein. Such a technique could be described in popular parlance as moving the goalposts to score a point.
3.8. Stereotyping. Does it ever occur to Mehrtens that significant differences may exist among the alleged C-types? The answer is that it does, as when he speaks of the individual who constructs himself as part of a higher order, and who, from that higher order, . . . receives the gift of a mathematical talent and thus the gift of insight into that higher order. This applies to Poincaré, Klein, Bieberbach and others, but not so much to the more radical and pessimistic Brouwer. I shall not discuss the individual differences here. . We note that, pace Mehrtens, stereotyping mathematicians into such categories serves no useful purpose if the historian's goal is meaningful history, though it may well serve a goal of the production of marxist historiography. In the end Mehrtens' claim concerning Hilbert that he was interested in production rather than meaning applies only to the author of the claim.
Mehrtens' systematic stereotyping reminds one of nothing more than similar procedures adopted by his nemesis Bieberbach. Thus, Segal summarizes Bieberbach's racial theorizing as follows:
Gauss was also contrasted with Carl Gustav Jacobi (a Jew). Jacobi was "oriental" and had a "heedless will to push through his own personality." Gauss was characterized as "nordisch-falisch," a term borrowed from H.F.K. Gunther's racial theories; similarly, Euler was "ostischdinarisch," another similar term. (Segal [57, p. 363]) See there for a discussion of Bieberbach's classification of J-types into subtypes J 1 , J 2 , J 3 . Mehrtens' final paragraph contains the following gem:
When the ideology of sound, realist common sense had crossed the border to Germany in the early thirties, mathematical modernism took the opposite route with a group of scholars that were to name themselves "Bourbaki" and to become the last high priests of mathematical modernism before the post-modern era. (Mehrtens [41, p. 527]; emphasis added) It is unclear what meaningful historiographic purpose is served by stereotyping the Bourbaki as "high priests. " Mehrtens' claim that in mathematics, modernism was followed by something called post-modernism may strike many a reader as novel. Then again such a reader may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of the received academic lingo. What objective does it serve to postulate a specifically post-modern phase in the development of mathematics? We will venture an explanation in Section 3.9. The root of the dilemma, as far as cultural criticism is concerned, is that Mehrtens and similar-minded marxist academics have a problem with the symbiotic relationship between capitalism on the one hand, and modernism and high culture on the other. After its revolutionary beginnings as a radical movement, 19 modernism went on to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with what Gray refers to as late capitalism, providing the source of the enmity toward modernism on the part of marxist academics disenchanted with bourgeois society. The said academics felt betrayed by modernism, and can therefore speak approvingly only of postmodernism (or pop art), never of modernism itself, as poignantly summarized by Hilton Kramer in his essay 'Modernism and its enemies':
. . . This view may be summed up as follows: Modernism claimed to be revolutionary, it claimed to be antibourgeois, it promised us a new world, but it turned out to be a coefficient of bourgeois capitalist culture, after all, and we therefore reject the claim of high culture and must work to destroy the privileged status it enjoys in the cultural life of the bourgeois democracies. (Kramer [34, p. 13 
])
To Mehrtens, applied mathematics is similarly a "coefficient of bourgeois capitalist culture" aiding and abetting not merely the bourgeois democracies but the NS regime as well:
The plan for an international congress for mechanics in Germany could be sold to the aircraft ministry as a necessity for productive aircraft research. 
Mehrtens' book
In his 1990 book, Mehrtens describes the modernist transformation of mathematics in the early 20th century in Germany. According to Mehrtens, such a transformation is embodied in Hilbert's formalism and Cantorian set theory.
Selective modernist transformation. Mehrtens frequently cites
Cantor's famous dictum on freedom being the essence of mathematics, but finesses the issues concerning the reality of mathematical objects where Cantor held decidedly unmodern views laced with both theology and metaphysics.
Oddly, Mehrtens does not mention Emmy Noether's school of abstract algebra, and only briefly notes the impression that van der Waerden's book Moderne Algebra had made on the young Dieudonné.
Whereas Gray treats Klein's Erlangen Program (EP) as the first item of his chapter "Mathematical Modernism Arrives" in [18] , Mehrtens sees Riemann's Habilitation talk of 1854 as the beginnining of modernism (but see Section 4.2), and Klein's EP as the first move of the Gegenmoderne. Having described it in five pages, he devotes another 19 pages to the interpretation of footnote III of the EP, titled "Über den Wert räumlicher Anschauung," i.e., the value of spatial intuition.
Here Mehrtens elaborates the key thesis of his book, namely the divide between mathematicians of respectively C-type and M-type (in our terminology; see Section 3.3). Mehrtens quotes, among others, Heidegger, Foucault, Marx, Kant and Einstein. This list of authors indicates that the divide has little to do with mathematics proper, but is concerned rather with the relation between mathematics and reality. While the M-types (according to Mehrtens) saw mathematics as a formal system detached from reality (Riemann had first developed an abstract theory, and then applied it to space), the C-types (Klein among them) insisted that "there is a true geometry which is not . . . intended to be merely an illustrative form of more abstract investigations."
The struggle between C-types and M-types became more heated in the decades following, although Mehrtens For the latter insisted that a refined understanding of Euclidean geometry was a dead end. In fact, at the very outset of his Habilitationsvortrag, Riemann proclaimed that the study of the foundations of geometry from Euclid to Legendre-seen as an empirical science-had remained in the dark, owing to a failure to explore crucial issues or hypotheses concerning physical measurements. Natural philosophers thus lacked a general theory of extended magnitudes or, to use modern language, an understanding of differential geometry in arbitrary dimensions. Axiomatics, on the other hand, plays virtually no role in Riemann's text, least of all speculations about a theory of parallels. (Rowe [54, p. 179 
])
Riemann's pervasive influence on modern mathematics ranges from the theory of Riemann surfaces and Riemannian geometry to the Riemann hypothesis and the deepest problems in number theory, and reaches as far as category theory (see Marquis [37] ).
Determined to frame Klein as a C-type, Mehrtens faces the formidable challenge of Klein's solid reputation as member of the Riemannian tradition at Göttingen. Mehrtens' strategy to circumvent the challenge is a tour de force of obfuscation.
Unable to deny Riemann's sterling reputation as a modern, Mehrtens concedes in [39, p. 67 ] that Riemann made 'the first move of modernity'. However, he then proceeds to paint a different picture, seeking to portray Riemann as a romantic with pantheistic views. Mehrtens attempts to back up his picture by collating and misrepresenting some passages from fragmentary personal notes of Riemann's (published posthumously by Dedekind and Weber as [47] ) and goes on to claim: In Riemann's philosophical fragments there is talk of an earth-soul, which is a moving, multifaceted thoughtprocess. 21 In his introduction, Mehrtens describes his procedure (including Discourse Analysis) as follows:
The sixth chapter, which sums up the interpretatory framework, and-using Discourse Analysis, Semiotics and Semiology, and Poetology-develops the leitmotifs, systematically and within the three images Eulenspiegel, the Golem, and Münchhausen, was the last chapter that I revised. (Mehrtens [39, p. 9] ; emphasis added) Examining pages 70-71 in [39] and applying such a 'Discourse Analysis' reveals that the names of Riemann (R), Klein (K), and Heidegger (H) occur here in close succession in the following order:
Mehrtens juxtaposes the names and accompanies them by obscure passages from fragments of Riemann's personal notes and cryptic phrases from Heidegger taken out of context, skillfully creating a flou artistique 21 In the original: "In Riemanns philosophischen Fragmenten ist die Rede von einer "Erdseele", die ein bewegter, vielfältiger "Denkprozess" ist." 22 In the original: "Das Erkennen gilt als eine Art des Vorstellens. In diesem Stellen kommt etwas, was uns begegnet, zum Stehen, zum Stand. Das im Vorstellen zum Stand gebrachte Begegnende ist der Gegenstand " (Heidegger [20, p. 46] ). The first sentence does not appear in Mehrtens' quotation of Heidegger, obscuring the meaning of the already difficult passage.
that suggests an affinity among the three protagonists, with an undercurrent of damaging innuendo implicating both Riemann and Klein in the swamp of Heidegger's well-known forays into politics. . 24 Lessing's speculations on race in this passage are rather wild-eyed by modern standards. Without providing an evaluation of Lessing's idiosyncratic speculations, Mehrtens abruptly returns to analyzing Klein's views, thereby implying guilt by association on Klein's part. A further example of assigning guilt by association is the following passage:
The biologistic-racist discourse, which was an everyday phenomenon in Wilhelmine Germany, and not only there, and which Klein served and amplified, was continued in the Nationalsozialismus. 34 In the original: "Wo er sich selbst einordnet, ist in den wertenden Beiworten deutlich und fügt sich in Kleins Kontinuitäten und in den gegenmodernen Diskurs: Die "Logik" und die "Willkür" der Moderne sind der abscheuliche Gegensatz zum rechten deutschen Mathematiker, der in frommer Bescheidenheit die 'ewige Wahrheit' stückchenweise aber "rein" durch "Eingebung" (sprich: Anschauung, Intuition) geschenkt bekommt" (emphasis added). 35 In the original: "Der Tonfall is religiös. Der Teufel, das sind die anderen; der Sündenfall ist die Willkür, die vor den Gegebenheiten der Wahrheit und der Macht den Nacken nicht beugt." 36 Nor did Klein refer to non-formalist mathematicians as the 'right' mathematicians. Mehrtens wishes to see a political statement in places where there is none. In keeping with an apparently irrepressible urge to paint Klein as a right-wing precursor of worse things to come, Mehrtens plays on an ambiguity of the German adjective recht (it could mean either right-minded, righteous, or right-wing is an additional instance of assigning guilt by association, as well as a character smear against Klein. In line with the Talmudic dictum cited in Section 4.5, Mehrtens seeks to argue a case of biological inevitability between the cocoon of Klein's remarks on intuition and race, on the one hand, and the dragon-butterfly (see e.g., Benisch [5] ) of the Nationalsozialismus, on the other. In the same year [1901, in a speech] before the 'support club' 39 Klein emphasizes "the importance of [higher] education in mathematics and the sciences in the competitive fight of the nations, and of the general cultural significance of high school education, and of a capable class of high school teachers supported by public trust." If the higher totality is culture, then the concrete totality is the nation in the imperialist competitive fight. . . . The goal was to define a modern culture in such a way, and to make it a state affair in such a way, that the professionals in natural-and social sciences, economics and bureaucracy rise to the rank of a state elite.
40 [39, p. 361 ] (emphasis on 'modern' in the original; emphasis on 'imperialist competitive fight' added)
The tone of the above passage is consistent with the identification of the source of the enmity toward modernism on the part of marxist academics and Hilton Kramer's diagnosis thereof (see Section 3.9).
That the driving force behind Mehrtens' animus toward Klein is marxist detestation of capitalism is confirmed by Mehrtens' analysis of a cartoon reproduced at [39, p. 381] . The cartoon represents the activities of the Göttinger Vereinigung founded by Klein, formed to encourage interactions between the Academy and Industry. The cartoon depicts recognizably professorial types exchanging books for proverbial moneybags brought by recognizably capitalist types. 41 Hovering over 39 This is a reference to an association charged with carrying out the reforms in the teaching of mathematics and science in German-speaking high school teaching. Mehrtens describes the cartoon as follows: "A contemporary caricature is more precise [than the logo] in that regard ( Figure 5) . Therein, at the signpost pointing towards the 'Göttinger Vereinigung', professors, clad in cap and gown, and with a large and a small book tucked under their arms, meet with the capitalists, unmistakable with their bellies and top hats, who carry a large and a small moneybag. After exchanging the small book for the small moneybag, they push along in pairs, engrossed in conversation" (translation ours). Mehrtens' sarcastic tone indicates that he views the cartoon as a satirical caricature; see note 42. the scene are a sun-like Klein and an angelic-looking Althoff (see Section 2.2), depicted as bestowing blessings upon the congregants. The cartoon is dated at 1908 in also [22] , [23] , [44] .
Mehrtens' purpose in reproducing the cartoon seems to be to compare it to the logo of the Göttinger Vereinigung which depicts a allegorical scene alluding to academic-industrial interactions. Thus, Mehrtens declares the cartoon to be a 'more accurate' ("genauer") representation of the activities of the Göttinger Vereinigung than the official logo (see [39, p. 382] ). 42 Mehrtens' own attitude toward such activities is spelled out clearly enough in the pages leading up to the cartoon:
The disposition over technical knowledge is being regulated via legal norms, by patent laws, and by laws for the protection of various secrets, in such a way that said knowledge is co-opted for use within the capitalist market, and for use within the military state. ideas is the discovery that mathematics is entirely independent of the physical world (except that thinking takes place in the brain). (Stone [58, p. 716 ]) Stone's idea of mathematics as independent of the physical world was eventually picked up by Quinn; see Bair et al. [2] .
In response to Stone's paper a symposium was held. Here Richard Courant, who was in many respects Klein's heir, had this to say:
Certainly mathematical thought operates by abstraction; mathematical ideas are in need of abstract progressive refinement, axiomatization, crystallization. It is true indeed that important simplification becomes possible when a higher plateau of structural insight is reached. . . . Yet, the life blood of our science rises through its roots; these roots reach down in endless ramification deep into what might be called reality, whether this "reality" is mechanics, physics, biological form, economic behavior, geodesy, or, for that matter, other mathematical substance already in the realm of the familiar. (Courant in Carrier et al. [9] ; emphasis added) Courant's tree metaphor, later elaborated by Kline, contrasted with the Bourbaki-Tucker city metaphor; see Phillips [45] for an analysis. Courant continued:
Abstraction and generalization is not more vital for mathematics than individuality of phenomena and, before all, not more than inductive intuition. Only the interplay between these forces and their synthesis can keep mathematics alive and prevent its drying out into a dead skeleton. . . . We must not accept the old blasphemous nonsense that the ultimate justification of mathematical science is 'the glory of the human mind'. (Courant in [9] ) Similarly, a letter by Morris Kline and others claimed that the relevance of mathematics for students emerges from concrete situations, not formalisms; Kline was to argue his point most forcefully in [33] . The history of modernism in mathematics is more complex than Herbert Mehrtens is willing to grant. [Alfred] Köpcke, 44 of Hamburg, has advanced the idea that our space-intuition is exact as far as it goes, but so limited as to make it impossible for us to picture to ourselves curves without tangents.
On one point Pasch does not agree with me, and that is as to the exact value of the axioms. He believes -and this is the traditional view -that it is possible finally to discard intuition entirely, basing the whole science on the axioms alone. I am of the opinion that, certainly, for the purposes of research it is always necessary to combine the intuition with the axioms. I do not believe, for instance, that it would have been possible to derive the results discussed in my former lectures, the splendid researches of Lie, the continuity of the shape of algebraic curves and surfaces, or the most general forms of triangles, without the constant use of geometrical intuition.
Pasch's idea of building up the science purely on the basis of the axioms has since been carried still farther by Peano, in his logical calculus.
Finally, it must be said that the degree of exactness of the intuition of space may be different in different individuals, perhaps even in different races. It would seem as if a strong naive space-intuition were an attribute pre-eminently of the Teutonic race, while the critical, purely logical sense is more fully developed in the Latin and Hebrew races. A full investigation of this subject, somewhat on the lines suggested by Francis Galton in his researches on heredity, might be interesting. (Klein [29, ; emphasis added) Klein's tentative comments on Teutonic, Hebrew, and Latin races, occupying a total of 6 lines in a 98-page text, were made in the context of • a discussion of Kopcke's views concerning space-intuition;
• an appreciation of Pasch's accomplishment vis-a-vis the foundations; • Klein's disagreement with Pasch with regard to the role of intuition in the creative process. We propose our own tentative interpretation of the "Teutonic, Latin, Hebrew" (T, L, H) comment. Confronted with the striking diffence in 44 Mathematician, 1852-1927, doctoral student of Leo Königsberger 1875 at Heidelberg.
It appears that antisemitism, racism, imperialism, domination, and (especially the sinister) biologism (see Section 4.4) are the first things that come to Mehrtens' mind when reading Klein's tentative comments on space-intuition and possible differences among ethnicities in intellectual outlook. As we already noted in Section 3.4, Mehrtens' racism slur against Klein is based on equivocation.
Mehrtens' diatribe against Klein rings particularly hollow to a reader aware of Mehrtens' cynical exploitation of the infamous yellow star badge in his comments on Hilbert:
Hilbert Mehrtens' flippant "set-building" comment comes disturbingly close to an odious trivialisation of the yellow star badge, a tragic symbol of the Holocaust.
Mehrtens and Gray on Hilbert.
Mehrtens presents Hilbert as the arch-modernist ("Generaldirektor der Moderne"). In Gray's words: Hilbert in particular has a major role, and his work is presented ironclad as a program to make all of mathematics abstract, axiomatic and internally self-consistent.
(Gray [18, p. 10] ) However, such a view of Hilbert's posture is based on a very selective reading of his works, taking into account only the Grundlagen der Geometrie and his work on the logical foundations of mathematics in the 1920s. On Hilbert's Zahlbericht, Corry writes: "The general idea of algebra as the discipline dealing with algebraic structures is still absent from Hilbert's work on algebraic number theory" (Corry [12, p. 154] ).
The same can be said concerning Hilbert's papers on integral equations, which were written between 1904 and 1910 in the language of classical analysis, and are far from the foundational work on abstract function spaces that was done at the same time by Fréchet, Riesz and Schmidt. Hilbert never ventured into a study of such spaces.
Corry quotes a passage from a 1905 lecture, which illustrates Hilbert's rather informal approach to axiomatics:
artikulieren, ist im nachhinein allzu deutlich" (an excerpt of this quotation already appeared in Section 4.4). 46 In the original: "Das Hilbertsche Paradies ist eine Diktatur. . . Der gelbe Stern ist, mathematisch gesehen, reine Mengenbildung."
The edifice of science is not raised like a dwelling, in which the foundations are first firmly laid and only then one proceeds to construct and to enlarge the rooms. Science prefers to secure as soon as possible comfortable spaces to wander around and only subsequently, when signs appear here and there that the loose foundations are not able to sustain the expansion of the rooms, it sets about supporting and fortifying them. This is not a weakness, but rather the right and healthy path of development. (Hilbert quoted in Corry [14] ) The following quotation from the foreword to the translation of Hilbert and Cohn-Vossen's Anschauliche [!] Geometrie [25] shows Hilbert in agreement with Klein with regard to the interplay between abstraction and intuition:
In mathematics, as in any scientific research, we find two tendencies present. On the one hand, the tendency toward abstraction seeks to crystallize the logical relations inherent in the maze of material that is being studied, and to correlate the material in a systematic and orderly manner. On the other hand, the tendency toward intuitive understanding fosters a more immediate grasp of the objects one studies, a live rapport with them, so to speak, which stresses the concrete meaning of their relations.
As to geometry, in particular, the abstract tendency has here led to the magnificent systematic theories of Algebraic Geometry, of Riemannian Geometry, and of Topology; these theories make extensive use of abstract reasoning and symbolic calculation in the sense of algebra. Notwithstanding this, it is still as true today as it ever was that intuitive understanding plays a major role in geometry. And such concrete intuition is of great value not only for the research worker, but also for anyone who wishes to study and appreciate the results of research in geometry. Here Hilbert can hardly be said to be involved in an ironclad program of making all of mathematics abstract and axiomatic. The empiricist inclinations in Hilbert's work in geometry are studied by Corry [13] Since the bulk of Hilbert's work with Bernays on Formalism and foundations started at about the time of Klein's death, Mehrtens' comment is an ahistorical collage in addition to involving an unhelpful stereotype.
Conclusion: Mehrtens' tools
In sum, this particular marxist historian has exploited a variety of tools in his analysis of Klein that ranges from massaging the evidence (Sections 1.6, 4.5) and character smear (Sections 3.4, 4.6) to assigning guilt by association (Sections 4.3, 4.6) and ahistorical collage (Section 4.11).
On occasion, Mehrtens sheds the mask of a marxist historian and engages in what is discernibly bourgeois yellow journalism, as in Mehrtens' tale concerning the dress embroidered with images of analytic curves with which Felix Klein allegedly "covered the body" of his bride, the tale in question being further embroidered by Mehrtens' tasteless comments at [39, p. 214 ].
Mehrtens' claim that Hilbert was interested in production rather than meaning applies only to the claim's author. Mehrtens' portrayal of Klein as countermodern is contrary to much historical evidence and must be rejected.
